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Abstract

Title:

The Significance of the Implied Mutual Duty of Trust and Confidence in the
Employment Relationship.

Objectives:

1.

Trace the development of the implied duty in the both the Irish and
English jurisdiction.

2.

Analyse the types of behaviour which will fall foul of the obligation to
maintain trust and confidence.

3.

Ascertain the limits of the implied duty.

4.

Assess the current judicial climate following the first Supreme Court
decision on the duty implied.

5.

Consider the implications of the implied duty on certain areas of
employment law.

6.

Determine the potential for further development of the implied duty.

Methods:

Qualitative and Quantitative Research
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Conclusions:

1.

The implied obligation is critically important in relation to the
interaction between the common law and statute and underpins all
employment relationships.

2.

The potential for damages via a claim of a breach of the implied duty
has been and will continue to be restricted.

3.

The judicial climate is in favour of avoiding setting too high a standard
for employers.

4.

A purely objective test fails to take account of the emotive nature of this
area of law and contradicts the requirement to consider the parties’
conduct as a whole.

5.

The modern interpretation of the concept is that it is prescriptive and this
narrowing has impacted on the requirements for interlocutory relief.

6.

The developing law on bonus payments is being shaped by reference to
the implied duty of trust and confidence.

7.

The implied duty has the potential to determine the parameters of the
law relating to workplace bullying.

8.

A breach of the implied duty can be waived but a finding of such should
necessarily require an employer to establish that an employee did so
with ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.

9.

Existing inconsistencies in this area of law should be mitigated such that
it will be possible to declare what the law relating to the implied duty is
in forthright terms.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The age when management could ‘hire and fire’ at will is gone and it is now
possible to assert that the employer has a legal duty to treat his employees with
due respect and consideration, mindful of their needs and problems and
sympathetic to their difficulties. It is no longer possible to treat an employee as
an expendable chattel, or as an object without feelings and emotions.

In Spring v Guardian Assurance 1 Lord Slynn took cognisance of:

“…the changes which have taken place in the employer/employee
relationship, with far greater duties imposed on the employer than in the
past, whether by statute or by judicial decision, to care for the physical,
financial and even psychological welfare of the employee 2 ”.

The evolution of the duty of mutual trust and confidence is a prime example of
this process. It has moved from a somewhat theoretical concept of contract law
used mainly to limit an employee’s actions, to a dynamic overarching term of
huge potential for an employee seeking to assert their position against the
inevitably more powerful employer.
Particularly strong recognition has been afforded to the role of the implied duty
of mutual trust and confidence in the employment relationship in a number of
contemporary High Court cases and most significantly the Supreme Court
recently dealt with the issue in Berber v Dunnes Stores 3 for the first time.

1

[1994] 3 All. E.R. 129
Ibid at p.161
3
Unreported, Supreme Court, 12th February, 2009.
2

9

Employers must be aware of the significance of this implied duty as it is no
longer enough for an employer to simply ensure compliance with the strict
terms of the employment contract. They must also take account of the
potentially broad reaching implications of the duty of trust and confidence that
they owe to their employees. 4 Traditional concepts such as the entitlement of
an employer not to furnish work to an employee as long as they are paid are
now undermined by radical new applications of this long-standing principle. 5

The purpose of this thesis is to consider in detail the development of this
implied duty, in terms of how it has been expanded and restricted, the conduct
of employers which has been found to breach the obligation, where the duty
currently stands in this jurisdiction, the far-reaching impact this duty has had on
various areas of employment law and its potential which, it is submitted, is yet
to be fully realised.

4

Bolger, M. & Ryan, D., 2007. The mutual duty of fidelity in the contract of employment: Significant
recent developments. (2007) 4(4) I.E.L.J. 112
5
See Chapter 5.6 - Failing to Provide Work.
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Chapter 2

Implied Terms in the Contract of Employment

2.1

Introduction

Implied terms allow the courts to achieve justice between the parties to
an employment contract where the express terms of the contract and the
existing statutory code are inadequate to the task.

Terms may be implied by one of two mechanisms:

2.2

1.

the ‘officious bystander’ test; or

2.

by law.

The ‘Officious Bystander’ Test

The first situation where the courts will, independently of statutory
requirement, imply a terms which has not been expressly agreed by the
parties to a contract was identified in the well-known Moorcock case 6
where a term not expressly agreed upon by the parties was inferred on
the basis of the presumed intention of the parties.

The basis for such a presumption was explained by MacKinnon LJ in
Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd 7 in the following terms:

“Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and
need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes
6
7

The Moorcock [1889] 14 P.D. 64
[1939] 2 K.B. 206

11

without saying; so that, if while the parties were making their
bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express
provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress
him with a common ‘Oh, of course’.” 8

2.3

Terms Implied by Law

Secondly, terms may be implied by law. There are a variety of cases in
which a contractual term has been implied on the basis, not of the
intention of the parties to the contract, but deriving from the nature of
the contract itself. Indeed in analysing the different types of case in
which a term will be implied Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City
Council v Irwin 9 preferred to describe the different categories which he
identified as no more than shades on a continuous spectrum.

Such an implication will be justified by the category of contract and by
necessity. For example, in Becton, Dickinson Ltd v Lee 10 , approved in
Bates v Model Bakery 11 , the Supreme Court held that an implied term
should be read into every contract of employment that service of a strike
notice of a length not shorter than would be required for notice to
terminate the contract, does not amount to notice to terminate the
contract, save for those circumstances where there is an express
provision to the contrary or where a contrary provision must, by
necessary implication, be read into the contract.

8

Ibid at p.227
[1977] A.C. 239
10
[1973] L.R. 1
11
[1993] 1 I.R. 359
9

12

2.4

Conclusion

Implied terms have mainly developed in the context of the employer’s
right to dismiss an employee without notice and in the context of
constructive dismissal. When determining the reasonableness of the
employer’s actions for purposes of unfair dismissal the ruling authority
(be it the Employment Appeals Tribunal or a Court) will be influenced
by the express and implied contractual terms agreed by the parties.

It is noteworthy that whichever test is used, a term will not be implied
into a contract where inconsistent with the express wording of the
contract or the surrounding circumstances or where it is unnecessary to
the efficacy of the contract 12 .

12

Sweeney v Duggan [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 211; Ali v Christian Salvesan Ltd [1997] I.C.R. 25; Sullivan v
Southern Health Board [1997] 3 L.R. 123

13

Chapter 3

Implied Term of Mutual Trust and Confidence

3.1

Introduction

In the late 1970’s in the case of Courthaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v
Andrew 13 the implied duty was formulated as follows:

“It was an implied term of the contract that the employers would
not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in
a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the
confidence and trust between the parties.” 14

The House of Lords in Mahmud & Malik v BCCI 15 significantly rejected
the antiquated notion of a ‘master and servant’ relationship and
recognised the fundamental “change in legal culture which made
possible the evolution of the implied term of trust and confidence”. 16

3.2

The Leading Authority: Mahmud & Malik v BCCI

The leading authority on the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
is the decision of the House of Lords in the aforementioned consolidated
appeals of Mahmud & Malik v BCCI 17 . The House of Lords was asked
to consider a case in which an employer was conducting a corrupt and
fraudulent business. The plaintiffs had not been involved in the
corruption, but nevertheless suffered financial losses and harm to their
13

[1979] I.R.L.R. 84
Ibid per Arnold J. at p.86
15
[1998] A.C. 20
16
Ibid per Lord Steyn at p.46
17
Supra, n.15
14

14

reputations and employment prospects when the employer’s fraudulent
practices were eventually exposed. The existence of such an implied
term of fidelity, trust and confidence was agreed between Counsel for
the respective parties and arguments therefore were focused on the
application of such a term and its precise scope.

The plaintiffs were long-serving senior employees. Their employment
was terminated by reason of redundancy when the bank went into
liquidation following allegations of corruption and dishonesty by the
bank. The plaintiffs claimed that they found it extremely difficult to
obtain new employment because they were tainted by their association
with the bank’s wrongdoing which was not due to their actions in any
way. The plaintiffs sought and obtained damages for injury to reputation
(‘stigma damages’) reflecting their loss of earnings arising from the
damage to their reputations within the financial services sector.

The House of Lords held that if the employer’s conduct was a breach of
the duty to maintain trust and confidence which detrimentally affected
an employee’s future employment prospects so as to give rise to
continuing financial loss, and it was reasonably foreseeable that such
loss was a serious possibility, damages would, in principle, be
recoverable if injury to reputation (and hence future employment
prospects) could be established as being a consequence of the breach.

In considering the nature of the relationship created by the employment
contract, Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn (with whom Lords Goff,
Mackay and Mustill agreed) held that, in agreeing to work for an
employer, an employee cannot be taken to agree to work in furtherance
of a dishonest business. Therefore, they must be entitled to leave that
employment immediately when such dishonesty comes to light. In order
to give effect to the right of the employee to leave without them

15

breaching the contract of employment, there must be a correlative
obligation or term implied in the employment contract that the employer
must not conduct a corrupt business. A breach of this term must
accordingly be characterised as a repudiation of the employment
contract that would entitle the employee to terminate the contract.

Accordingly, the House of Lords considered that an implied term that
the employer not conduct a corrupt or fraudulent business was necessary
in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the employment contract
and to allow the parties to enjoy the rights conferred by the contract of
employment. More specifically, this term was necessary to ensure that
the employee could enjoy the contractual benefit of employment by an
honest employer.

3.3

Conclusion

It is significant that for the purposes of assessing the plaintiff’s claims it
was assumed that the business had been run in a dishonest or corrupt
fashion, and the highly unusual nature of the case was captured in the
following passage of the judgment of Lord Nicholls:

“[O]ne of the assumed facts in the present case is that the
employer was conducting a dishonest and corrupt business. I
would like to think that this will rarely happen in practice.” 18

18

Supra, n.15 per Lord Nicholls at p.42

16

Notwithstanding the unusual facts, the scope of the duty was articulated
in broad terms. In his judgment Lord Nicholls described the implied
obligation as:

“[n]o more than one particular aspect of the portmanteau,
general obligation not to engage in conduct likely to undermine
the trust and confidence required if the employment relationship
is to continue in the manner the employment contract implicitly
envisages.” 19

The implied term of trust and confidence is the most central implied
term of the contract of employment. The breadth of the definition has
spawned much litigation in recent years and generated a great deal of
academic attention, having been described as: assuming a central
position in the law of the contract of employment 20 ; being undoubtedly
the most powerful engine of movement in the modern law of
employment contracts 21 ; and forming the cornerstone of the legal
construction of the contract of employment 22 .

19

Supra, n.15 per Lord Nicholls at p.34
Brodie, D., 1996. The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence. I.L.J. Vol. 25, No. 2
21
Freedland, M.R., 2003. The Personal Employment Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
22
Collins, H., 2003. Employment Law. Oxford Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
20
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Chapter 4

The Significance of a Breach

4.1

Introduction

Employees have sought to rely on the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence in order to seek greater damages than those traditionally
available for breach of contract.

4.2

Damages are Irrecoverable for Manner of Dismissal

In Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd 23 , the House of Lords held that an
employee cannot recover damages for the manner in which a wrongful
dismissal took place, for injured feelings or for any loss he or she may
sustain from the fact that having been dismissed makes it more difficult
for him to obtain new employment.

In Kinlan v Ulster Bank 24 , citing Addis with approval, then Chief Justice
Kennedy stated the proposition as follows:

“It is very clearly settled, both in this country and in England,
and affirmed in many cases that in actions for breach of contract
damages may not be given for such matters as disappointment of
mind, humiliation, vexation, or the like, nor may exemplary or
vindicative damages be awarded.” 25

23

[1909] A.C. 488
[1928] I.R. 171
25
Ibid at p.184
24

18

4.3

Distinguishing Addis from Malik

In recent years, relying on the implied term of trust and confidence,
plaintiffs have sought to escape the rule in Addis. They have been
assisted in this by Malik in which, as set out above, the House of Lords
held that there was an implied obligation on an employer that he would
not carry on a dishonest or corrupt business and that if it was reasonably
foreseeable that in consequences of such corruption there was a serious
possibility that an employee’s future employment prospects would be
handicapped, damages would be recoverable for any such continuing
financial losses sustained.

The case of Malik arose out of an application by the respondent to strike
out the employee’s Statement of Claim that it was a viable claim that the
respondent had breached this term due to the corrupt and dishonest way
it had operated, which had left the appellants with a stigma attached to
their reputations. As detailed above, they contended that it was thus
more difficult to find employment, notwithstanding the fact that they
were entirely innocent of wrongdoing. Accordingly, the appellants were
held to be entitled on a strikeout application to proceed to claim
damages for the financial loss suffered by them, although after a full
trial they failed to prove their case.

Addis could be distinguished from Malik, given that the loss in Malik
was a financial loss arising from a breach of contract independently of
and prior to the fact of dismissal. However, the Court went further than
simply to distinguish Addis. Lord Nicholls stated that Addis did not
preclude the recovery of damages where the manner of dismissal

19

involved a breach of the trust and confidence term and this caused
financial loss. 26

Lord Steyn asserted that Addis did not decide that an employee may not
recover financial loss for damage to his or her employment prospects
caused by a breach of contract or that in breach of contract cases
compensation for loss of reputation can never be awarded, or that it can
only be awarded in cases falling in certain defined categories. Addis
simply decided that the loss of reputation in that particular case could
not be compensated because it was not caused by a breach of contract.

4.4

Conclusion

This is a question that awaits resolution in Irish law. When the matter
came before the High Court in Cronin v Eircom Ltd 27 Laffoy J. did not
consider it necessary to express any view on the status in this
jurisdiction of the decision in the Addis case.

Interestingly however, in Carey v Independent Newspapers (Ireland)
Limited 28 Gilligan J. commented that it was “of interest to note that
other common law jurisdictions have rejected Addis”. 29

26

Supra, n.15 at p. 615
[2007] E.L.R. 84
28
[2004] 3 I.R. 52
29
Ibid at p.82 citing the approach of the New Zealand High Court in Stuart v Armourguard Security
[1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 484
27
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Chapter 5

Manifestations of the Implied Term in Case Law

5.1

Introduction

The implied term of trust and confidence has proved to be a powerful
tool for employees seeking redress against their employers. Its
manifestations are various.

5.2

Unwarranted Suspension

In Gogay v Herts CC 30 the issue was whether the defendant local
authority acted reasonably in suspending the claimant from her post in a
residential home while they investigated the circumstances surrounding
a child living in that home. The investigation concluded that there was
no case to answer, but the claimant suffered psychiatric illness and loss
of earnings as a result of her suspension.

Hale LJ stated that the implied term of confidence and trust requires an
employer, in the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Malik:

“not to engage in conduct likely to undermine the trust and
confidence required if the employment relationship is to continue
in the manner the employment contract implicitly envisages…The
conduct must, of course, impinge on the relationship in the sense
that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy of seriously

30

[2000] I.R.L.R. 703

21

damage the degree of trust and confidence the employer is
reasonable entitled to have in his employer”. 31

Hale LJ further went on to point out that Lord Steyn emphasised that the
obligation applies:

“only where there is ‘no reasonable and proper cause’ for the
employer’s conduct, and then only if the conduct is calculated to
destroy or seriously damage the relationship…” 32

Hale LJ considered whether the authority’s conduct amounted to a
breach of this implied term, opining that the test is a severe one. The
conduct must be such as to destroy or seriously damage the relationship.
This conduct in this case was not only to suspend the claimant, but to do
so by means of a letter which stated that “the issue to be investigated is
an allegation of sexual abuse made by a young person in our care”.
Hale LJ stated that sexual abuse is a very serious matter, doing untold
damage to those who suffer it and further to be accused of it is also a
serious matter. To be told by one’s employer that one has been so
accused is clearly calculated seriously to damage the relationship
between employer and employee. The next question was therefore
whether there was ‘reasonable and proper cause’ to do this.

In Lord Justice Hale’s judgment there clearly was not. The information
considered by the investigator of the allegations and the strategy
meeting convened by him to consider and plan that investigation was
“difficult to evaluate”. The difficulty was in determining what, if
anything, the child in care who had both learning and communication
difficulties and who had been sexually abused by her father, was trying
31
32

Supra, n.15 at p.35A & C
Supra, n.30 at p.53B

22

to convey. It was agreed that it warranted further investigation but to
describe it as an “allegation of sexual abuse” was putting it far too high.
A close reading of the records, coupled with further inquiries of the
child’s therapist, was needed before it could be characterised as such.
There was therefore a breach of the term and the employee was entitled
to something better than the ‘knee-jerk’ reaction of suspension.

5.2.1 Distinguishing Types of Suspension: Punitive & Holding

It is noteworthy that if the Gogay line of reasoning is to accepted in this
jurisdiction, of significance would be the fact that the Irish courts have
drawn a distinction between two types of suspension: punitive and
holding and existing case law to this effect may exert a salient influence
on whether the Irish courts would, in the context of a suspension, find
the mutual duty to have been engaged. 33

The distinction between the two types of suspension was explained by
Barr J. in Quirke v Bord Luthchleas na hEireann 34 as follows:

“[S]uspension…may take two different forms. On the one hand, it
may be imposed as a holding operation pending the investigation
of a complaint. Such a suspension does not imply that there has
been a finding of any misbehaviour or breach of rules by the
suspended person, but merely that an allegation of some such
impropriety or misconduct has been made against the member in
question. On the other hand, the suspension may be imposed not
as a holding operation pending the outcome of an inquiry, but as
a penalty by way on punishment of a member who has been found
guilty of misconduct or breach of rules. The importance of the
33
34

See supra, n.4
[1988] I.R. 83
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distinction is that where a suspension is imposed by way of
punishment, it follows that the body in question has found it’s
guilty of significant misconduct or breach of rules.” 35

The importance of this distinction was illustrated in the High Court
judgment of Morgan v Trinity College 36 . The plaintiff was employed as
a senior lecturer in the Department of English in Trinity College Dublin.
He was suspended with pay with immediate effect on foot of a
complaint made by a female colleague who alleged physical
intimidation and harassment. The plaintiff applied, inter alia, for an
interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendants from removing him
from office and restraining them from embarking on a disciplinary
inquiry. He contended, inter alia, that there was a failure to comply with
natural justice in that he did not have an opportunity to challenge his
accusers during the investigation, and that his suspension was invalid as
it constituted a second suspension and should in any event be lifted by
reason of its duration.

Kearns J. refused the relief sought and held that whether a suspension
amounted to a sanction such as would invoke concepts of natural justice
or give rise to an inference that the person concerned had been found
guilty of significant misconduct was, in every case, a question of fact
and degree. Kearns J. emphasised the importance of the distinction
between a holding suspension and a punitive suspension, citing the
above passage from the judgment of Barr J. in Quirke. Kearns J. stressed
that in the context of a punitive suspension, the person affected was
entitled to be afforded natural justice and fair procedures before the
decision to suspend was taken; by contrast, in the latter case, the rules of
natural justice might not apply.
35
36

Ibid at p.87
[2003] 3 I.R. 157

24

It should be noted however that while the period of the suspension must
be sufficiently reasonable to allow the investigation to take place (as
pointed out by Kearns J. in Quirke) a suspension will not be allowed to
continue for an “inordinate and unjust” amount time. This was held to
be so in Martin v Nationwide Building Society 37 wherein Macken J. in
the High Court granted an injunction allowing the Plaintiff to return to
work even though he had been suspended to allow an investigation into
allegations of misconduct. In order to avoid activating the implied duty
in such a circumstance, employers should ensure that investigations are
carried out in a prompt and efficient manner.

5.3

An Invitation to Resign

There was also found to be a breach in Billington v Michael Hunter &
Sons Ltd 38 , which proceeded as an appeal against a Decision of the
Employment Tribunal wherein, by a majority, the Employment Tribunal
held that there had not been a fundamental breach of contract so that her
resignation could not be construed as a dismissal. The Appellant’s case
was that she had been constructively dismissed by the Respondent
employer when she was told that she was likely to face dismissal on the
outcome of a disciplinary investigation, but may instead resign on a
generous resignation package.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal again observed that a proper
consideration of this implied term may involve two separate issues.
Firstly there may be the question whether an employer has conducted
itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage
the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties. If the
answer to that question is no, that is the end of the case; but if the
37
38

[2001] 1 I.R. 228
[2003] UKEAT 0578 03 1610, 16th October, 2003.
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answer is yes, a second issue arises, namely whether the employer has
done so without reasonable and proper cause.

As to the first question, in the judgment of the Employment Appeal
Tribunal the Employment Tribunal’s findings were only consistent with
a conclusion that the Respondent did conduct itself in a manner
calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of
confidence and trust between the parties. Firstly, it was noted that there
was an express finding that at a final meeting, which was said by the
employer not to be a continuation of the disciplinary meeting held some
days earlier but did have connection with it and its intention was to
examine and discuss the Appellant’s performance and whether she felt
able to continue this the job, the Respondent invited the Appellant to
resign and offered her favourable terms if she could choose to do so.

Secondly, it was noted that the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion that
the Respondent was indicating on that day that it regarded itself as better
off without her and that any reasonable employee on that date could
have regarded the invitation to resign as being a vote of no confidence in
her. Thirdly it was noted that the Employment Tribunal found the
minute that that meeting to be accurate or at any rate not fundamentally
to misrepresent what was said at the meeting.

On this third finding, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that if it
was so, then the minute itself betrayed a remarkable state of affairs. The
Appellant was told that the meeting was not a continuation of the
disciplinary meeting, but a number of further allegations were put to her
and in the result it was made clear to her that if there were any further
instances such as those that had already been detailed and those
mentioned at this meeting, she would very likely be dismissed. The
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earlier meeting had ended in a written warning. This in substance was a
final warning.

That, coupled with the invitation to resign, the ‘vote of no confidence’
which the Employment Tribunal had found, and other things that were
said in the minute of that meeting as well about “sullen behaviour” and
the like, lead the Employment Appeal Tribunal to the conclusion that the
Respondent certainly behaved in a manner calculated and likely to
destroy or seriously damage its relationship with the Appellant.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered with the vote of no
confidence was justified by repeated complaints and therefore the
“without reasonable and proper cause” element of the implied term was
unsatisfied but found that the reference to repeated complaints to be
insufficient to meet the requirement of reasonable and proper cause
without any further finding or investigation.

5.4

Failing to Alert to a Vacancy

Perhaps one of the most interesting manifestations of this principle is to
be found in the case of Visa International Service Association v Paul 39 ,
the English Employment Appeals Tribunal held that the employers had
fundamentally breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
entitling the claimant to claim constructive dismissal, by failing to notify
her, while she was on maternity leave, of a vacancy for which she would
have applied if she had been aware of it, notwithstanding that she could
not have been short-listed for the post. In reference to the argument that
no fundamental breach of contract by the respondent was made out in

39
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circumstances where the Tribunal found as a fact that the applicant was
not ‘shortlistable’ for the post, Judge Peter Clarke stated,

“That, in our view, misses the point. Her complaint was not that
she had not been informed of a job opportunity which turned out
to be illusory. It was that she believed that she was suitable for
the post ad the Respondent’s failure to notify her of that
opportunity fatally undermined her trust and confidence in the
Respondent after twelve years service. That case, upheld by the
Tribunal, was not dependent on her losing the chance, in fact, of
successfully applying for the post. The Tribunal’s conclusion is,
in our judgment, consistent with the formulation of the implied
term to be found in the judgment of Brown-Wilkinson P in Woods
v WM Car Services [1981] ICR 666 (EAT) at 670; and by the
House of Lords in Mahmud v BCCI [1997] IRLR 462…”

5.5

Foul & Abusive Language

Again, in Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald International40 , the English
High Court held that the conduct of the defendant company’s chief
executive in asserting his authority over the claimant senior managing
director by the use of foul and abusive language which gave the
claimant no chance to respond to any criticism, and insisting on
standards of achievement which he had no grounds for believing the
claimant could attain amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust
and confidence. Newman J stated that:

“The law has developed so as to recognise an employment
contract as engaging obligations in connection with the self
40

[2003] I.R.L.R. 756
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esteem and dignity of the employee. There is an obvious tension
between the circumstances which have been address in this
development of the law and the currency of the language in
evidence in this case.” 41

Newman J referred to the following passage from the speech of Lord
Steyn in Malik:

“…The major importance of the implied duty of trust and
confidence lies in its impact on the obligations of the
employer…And the implied obligation as formulated is apt to
cover the great diversity of situations in which a balance has to be
struck between an employer’s interest in managing his business as
he sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being unfairly and
improperly exploited.

The evolution of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
is a fact…It has proved workable in practice. It has not been the
subject of an adverse criticism in any decided cases and it has
been welcomed in academic writings. I regard the emergence of
the implied obligation of trust and confidence as a sound
development.” 42

5.6

Failing to Provide Work

In Ireland, the scope of the mutual duty of fidelity, trust and confidence
was greatly expanded by the judgment of Laffoy J. in Cronin v Eircom
Limited 43 mentioned above. In this case, the plaintiff had been employed
41
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43
Supra, n.27
42

29

by the defendant since 1999. She was paid a salary and earned a bonus.
On the 10th of April 2000 the plaintiff was seconded to Eircom UK Ltd,
a subsidiary of Eircom Plc, on terms that she was to remain an employee
of Eircom Plc, that her conditions of employment, except as varied by
terms of a letter dated 6th April 2000, and any other contractual
entitlements, were to remain unchanged and that at the end of
secondment she would continue in employment with Eircom Ireland in
accordance with existing terms and conditions of employment.

Later in the year 2000, and whilst on secondment, the Plaintiff was
promoted to the position of Accounts Manager for Irish Accounts. Her
salary increased and the introduction of a commission scheme was
promised. However, all other terms, conditions and benefits were to
remain unchanged. On the 26th of April 2001 the Plaintiff was informed
that due to dramatic restructuring within the company, the business
could no longer sustain her secondment as Account Manager for Irish
Accounts and that she was to be repatriated to Eircom Plc with effect
from the 31st of May 2001.

From that time until February 2005 when she was offered a position of
Product Support Executive, the plaintiff had been deprived of an
appropriate job by the defendant. The essence of the case was there was
implied into the contract of employment a term of mutual trust and
confidence which required the employer to provide the plaintiff with
work which matched her skills and the achievements she had
accomplished. In failing to provide such work, the defendant had
thereby deprived her of opportunities which would have been available
to her to be promoted and to advance her career. As a consequence, it
was submitted, the plaintiff’s career prospects had been damaged both
within the defendant and generally.
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Laffoy J. found in favour of the plaintiff. In a radical departure from the
traditional view that an employer was only obliged to pay remuneration
rather than to provide work, Laffoy J. accepted that the plaintiff had a
contractual right to be provided with work “so that she would have an
opportunity to gain experience, pursue promotion in her job and
advance her career”. 44

On the facts, Laffoy J. did not consider it was an appropriate case to
award stigma damages and referred to the decision in Malik as “not
really apposite” in that the plaintiff in Cronin was still an employee of
the defendant and had not been put in the position of seeking alternative
employment.

5.7

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above, the implied duty is implicit in cases
involving dismissal or disciplinary procedures and is particularly evident
where the employer is alleged to have been carrying out provocative
conduct.

The cases considered above demonstrate how the duty as formulated is
apt to cover the diversity of situations in which a balance has to be
struck between an employer’s interest in managing his business as he
sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being unfairly and improperly
exploited.

44
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Chapter 6

Limits to the Implied Duty

6.1

Introduction

As noted in by Gilligan J. in Carey 45 the case of Malik was authority for
a limited right of recovery where an employee’s future job prospects
have been damaged by the employer. It is now proposed to consider how
the common law relating to the implied obligation has been shaped by
the gradual setting of boundaries on the recoverability of damages where
trust and confidence is at issue.

6.2

Restrictions on the Right to Recovery

The status of Malik was the subject of argument in the High Court case
of McGrath v Trintech Technologies Ltd and Trintech Group Plc 46
wherein Laffoy J. rejected the proposition that the mutual duty of trust
and confidence could imply into the contractual relationship a term that
the plaintiff would not be dismissed without due cause or without
reasonable notice or consultation and that the defendant would adopt fair
procedures in any review or selection process for dismissal or
redundancy in a manner that would suggest a consistency with the
approach of the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys 47 which case shall
also be considered herein.

45
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In support of their submission that it is settled law that the employment
relationship is governed by an implied term of mutual trust and
confidence, Counsel on behalf of Mr. McGrath referred to Redmond’s
“Dismissal Law in Ireland” 48 at paragraph 2.11 wherein the evolution of
the implied terms of mutual trust and confidence in a contract of
employment is analysed. It is stated that the modern approach is
prescriptive: the mutual duty of trust and confidence obliges the parties
in the contract of employment to behave towards one another in a way
which respects trust and confidence and enables it to flourish between
them. On the employer’s side, it is suggested his prescriptive duty not to
do anything to destroy the relationship of confidence translates, inter
alia, into a duty to provide fair procedures in disciplinary matters, a
prescriptive duty already endorsed in this jurisdiction in the
Constitution.

Laffoy J. narrowed the question arising in that matter as to whether that
broad principle can accommodate the implication in the contractual
relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant of terms that the plaintiff
would not be dismissed without due cause or without reasonable notice
or consultation and that the defendant would adopt fair procedures in
any review or selection process for dismissal or redundancy, the breach
of which would give rise to an action at common law.

In contending that it cannot do so in a manner as to give rise to an
inconsistency or conflict with another contractual term governing the
relationship of the parties, the defendant referred to the speech of Lord
Hoffman in Johnson 49 . In his speech, having acknowledged that the
contribution of the common law to the employment revolution has been
by the evolution of implied terms in the contract of employment, the
48
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most far-reaching being the implied term of trust and confidence, Lord
Hoffman went on to say:

“The problem lies in extending or adapting any of these implied
terms to dismissal. There are two reasons why dismissal presents
special problems. The first is that any terms which the courts
imply into a contract must be consistent with the express terms of
the contract but cannot contradict them. Only Parliament may
actually override what the parties have agreed…” 50

On the facts of the Johnson case, Lord Hoffman stated that, in the face
of the express provision in Mr. Johnson’s contract that Unisys was
entitled to terminate his employment at four weeks’ notice without any
reason, it was very difficult to imply a term that Unisys should not do so
except for some good cause and after giving reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate that no such cause existed.

Lord Steyn who dissented on the issue as to whether Mr. Johnson had a
reasonable cause of action based on breach of the implied obligation of
trust and confidence, took a different view. Commenting on the
argument by Counsel for Unisys that to apply the implied obligation of
mutual trust and confidence in relation to a dismissal was to bring it into
conflict with the express terms of the contract, he said:

“Nevertheless, relying on the notice provision, Counsel for the
employers submitted that to apply the implied obligation of
mutual trust and confidence in relation to a dismissal is to bring
it into conflict with the express terms of the contract. He said
orthodox contract law does not permit such a result. His
50
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argument approached the matter as if one was dealing with the
question of whether a term can be implied in fact in the light of
the express terms for the contract. This submission loses sight of
the particular nature of the implied obligation of mutual trust and
confidence. It is not a term implied in fact. It is an overarching
obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract of
employment. It can also be described as a legal duty imposed by
law: Treitel, The Law of Contract, p 190. It requires at least
express words of a necessary implication to displace it or to cut
down its scope. Prima facie it must be read consistently with the
express terms of the contract. This emerges from the seminal
judgment of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Imperial
Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 WLR
589. It related to an employer’s express contractual right to
refuse amendments under a pension scheme. The ViceChancellor held that the employer’s express rights were subject
to the implied obligation that they should not be exercised so as
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and
confidence between the company and its employees and former
employees. The employer’s blanket refusal was unlawful. The
decision did not involve trust law and the employer was not
treated as a fiduciary. It was decided on principles of contract
law. Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C described the implied
obligation of trust and confidence as “the implied obligation of
good faith”. It could also be described as an employer’s
obligation of fair dealing. In the same way an employer’s express
right to transfer an employee may be qualified b the obligation of
mutual trust and confidence: see United Bank Ltd v Akhtar
[1989] IRLR 507, Sweet & Maxwell’s Encyclopaedia of
Employment Law, vol 1, paras 1.5101 and 1.5107. The
interaction of the implied obligation of trust and confidence and
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express terms of the contract can be compared with the
relationship between duties of good faith or fair dealings with the
express terms of notice in a contract. They can live together.

Lord Steyn went on to say, however, that:

“The notice provision in the contract is valid and effective.
Nobody suggests the contrary. On the other hand, the employer
may become liable in damages if he acts in breach of the
independent implied obligation by dismissing the employee in a
harsh and humiliating manner. There is no conflict between the
express and implied terms. I would therefore dismiss this
argument.”

Laffoy J. found however that the essence of Mr. McGrath’s case was
that there should be implied into his contract with the defendant a term
that mere compliance with the express notice provision in the contract
would not validly and effectively terminate the contractual relationship
at common law. The learned judge went on to say that there was no
authority for such a proposition and that she was persuaded by the
authorities cited by the defendant’s Counsel that the proposition is not
sound in principle.

Accordingly, Laffoy J. came to the conclusion that terms in relation to
dismissal and redundancy on the lines pleaded by the plaintiff could not
be implied into the plaintiff’s contract of employment with the
defendant so as to give rise to a cause of action at common law and in
circumstances where such protection and remedies as are afforded by
statute to the plaintiff regarding incidents which prevailed cannot be
pursued at first instance in a plenary action in the High Court.
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6.3

Conclusion

This proposition was been further supported in the later High Court
judgment of Pickering v Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited 51
wherein Esmond Smyth J. referred to the approach of Laffoy J. in
McGrath and concluded as follows:

“I am satisfied that the position at common law continues to be
that an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for any
reason or no reason, on giving reasonable notice, and that
damages for the manner of a dismissal are confined to those
damages to which an employee would be entitled for the notice
period and do not include damages for the manner of dismissal.
Furthermore, not can an implied term, such as for example, an
implied term of mutual trust and confidence, be relied on to
circumvent that principle.” 52
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Chapter 7

Psychiatric Injury Arising out of Employer’s Breach of Trust

7.1

The English Approach

Attempts by plaintiffs in the UK to rely upon Malik in an attack upon
Addis have failed because of the existence of the statutory remedy for
unfair dismissal.

In Johnson (followed in Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc 53 ), the plaintiff
was summarily dismissed and was awarded damages for unfair dismissal
by an industrial tribunal. He then instituted fresh proceedings and was
awarded damages for unfair dismissal by an industrial tribunal. He then
instituted fresh proceedings seeking damages for psychiatric injury
suffered arising out of his employer’s breach of the implied term of trust
and confidence in the manner in which he was dismissed. The House of
Lords dismissed his claim. The majority of the House of Lords held that
the contractual duty of trust and confidence did not apply to dismissal or
the manner in which employment was terminated. It declined to extend
the scope of the implied term of trust and confidence to the context of a
dismissal. It held that to do so would be inappropriate, given the
statutory remedy for unfair dismissal.
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Their Lordships also reasoned that the implied term of trust and
confidence is concerned with preserving the continuing relationship of
employment and not linked to its termination. Consequentially, Lord
Hoffman opined:

“So it does not seem altogether appropriate for use in connection
with the way that relationship is terminated. If one is looking for
an implied term, I think a more elegant solution is…[the]
implication of a separate term that the power of dismissal will be
exercised fairly and in good faith. But the result would be the
same as that for which Mr. Johnson contends by invoking the
implied term of trust and confidence. As I have said, I think it
would be possible to reach such a conclusion without
contradicting the express term that the employer is entitled to
dismiss without cause.”

While Johnson therefore limits the scope of the implied term of trust and
confidence, the case of McCabe v Cornwall County Council 54 is
authority for the fact that Johnson does not preclude an employee from
seeking damages for psychiatric injury in respect of disciplinary
proceedings arising independently of dismissal.

54
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7.2

The Irish Approach

The Irish High Court showed a similar disposition to that taken by the
House of Lords in Johnson. Mr. Justice Smyth in Harrington v Irish Life
and Permanent plc 55 dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in respect of
personal injuries arising out of a breach of his contract of employment in
a few words:

“[The argument that] the Plaintiff was entitled to damages for
personal injuries was also advanced, but I am satisfied, on the
authority of the Bliss case, in which the Court held that the
defendant employer had fundamentally breached the contract of
employment by requiring the plaintiff to provide a psychiatric
report as a condition of return to work, that the general rule laid
down by the House of Lords in Addis v Gramophone Company
Limited [1909] A.C. 488 is that where damages fall to be
assessed for breach of contract rather than tort it is not
permissible to award general damages for frustration, mental
distress, injured feelings or annoyance caused by the breach’ is
the applicable law in this jurisdiction’ ”.

Mr. Justice Smyth did not allude to Johnson and neither Bliss nor Addis
provide authority for the proposition that a plaintiff may not obtain
damages for personal injuries arising out of a breach of contract. 56
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Interestingly, in Quigley v Complex Tooling and Moulding57 the
Plaintiff appeared to be seeking damages for stress and distress suffered
by him during a lead up to a termination of his employment. Lavan J.
expressly distinguished what had been held in McGrath and found that
Mr. Quigley was seeking to establish that the conduct of the employer
during the employment was such as to amount to a breach of an implied
duty to maintain trust and confidence during the employment
relationship, and caused him injury. The court accepted that this claim
was separate and distinct from the claim for unfair dismissal.

57
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Chapter 8

Assessing whether a Breach Occurred
8.1

Introduction

An important consideration in regard to the nature of the duty concerns
whether an objective or subjective standard is to be applied to the
assessment of its alleged breach. Crucially, in Malik the Law Lords
rejected the submission advanced on behalf of the bank that, as the
employees were unaware of the bank’s wrongdoing during their
employment, their confidence in their employer could not have been
undermined. This argument was predicated upon the acceptance of a
subjective standard which the Law Lords held was inappropriate. 58

As Lord Nicholls observed:

“[T]he objective standard provides the answer to the
[Respondent’s] submission that unless the employee’s confidence
is actually undermined there is no breach. A breach occurs where
the proscribed conduct takes place; here, by operating a
dishonest and corrupt business. Proof of a subjective loss of
confidence is not an essential element of the breach.”

It is the effect of the impugned conduct, as distinct from the motivation
behind that conduct, which is relevant for the purposes of assessing
whether the duty of trust and confidence has been breached.

58

Supra, n.4

42

8.2

Case Study - The First Decision of the Supreme Court on the Implied
Duty: Berber v Dunnes Stores

8.2.1 Introduction

That same objective standard has recently been expressly endorsed as
forming part of Irish law by the Supreme Court on an employer’s
successful appeal in Berber v Dunnes Stores Limited 59 . Laffoy J. had
found in the employee’s favour in the High Court and her contrary
findings shall be considered also. As aforesaid this is the first judgment
of the Supreme Court on the implied duty and it is therefore worthy of
detailed consideration.

The respondent advanced a number of causes of action in his pleadings
and while two issues arose for the purposes of the Appeal, the following
question considered by the Supreme Court is for present purposes, that
of interest is whether the respondent was wrongfully dismissed by
reason of a breach by the appellant of the implied term of the contract of
employment that it would not conduct itself in a manner likely to
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust
between the employer and employee, such breach amounting to
repudiation of the contract of employment which the Respondent was
entitled to accept.

59

Supra, n.3
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8.2.2 The Facts

In examining the Supreme Court’s approach to the implied term of trust
and confidence, it is essential to set out the factual background of this
case. The respondent commenced employment with the appellant as a
Trainee Manager in April 1980 at the age of 19. On completion of his
training he was employed as Store Manager at various locations until
1988. From 1988 until November 2000 he transferred from store
management to the position of Buyer being successively Group
Footwear Merchandiser, Men’s Footwear Buyer and Men’s Readymade
Buyer. On his last management performance review in February 2000
his performance was generally rated at the level of “effective
contribution”. The assessment provided for four performance standards
in descending order – excellent, effective contribution and below
standard. The review contained a comment “colour issue”. Some years
prior to that review the appellant had a colour blindness test carried out
on all buyers and the respondent was reported as colour blind.
Notwithstanding this he had been moved to a position as Men’s
Readymade Buyer. From February 2000 onwards the plaintiff’s
evidence was there was a change of attitude towards him evinced by the
following: -

(a)

Unlike previous years as a buyer when he spend as many
as 50 days abroad during 2000 he was sent abroad only
once; and

(b)

There was an increased interest in the state of his health
notwithstanding an excellent work attendance record. He
had been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease in 1978. He had
a recurrence of his disease in 1995 and again in Spring
2000. In the years 1995, 1996 and 1999 he missed one day
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through illness. He had no absences in 1998. He was
absent for five days in 1997 and five days in 1997 and
seven days in 2000 up to the 23rd of November 2000. 60

In July 2000 he was told that he was not being sent on a trip to the Far
East because Mrs. Heffernan was concerned that he might get ill on
account of his Crohn’s disease and he considered this “bizarre”. In
October 2000 the respondent was informed that he was to be transferred
from buying back to store management and his colour blindness was
averted to at this time. He was informed on the 22nd of November 2000
that he was to be moved to the appellant’s store in the ILAC Centre
Dublin as either Department Manager of Menswear or Ladieswear. The
respondent considered this demotion and sought a meeting with Mrs.
Heffernan and a meeting took place on the 23rd of November 2000. At
the meeting it was agreed that the respondent would return to store
management initially at the Appellant’s store in Blanchardstown
Shopping Centre, which was regarded as the flagship store, where he
would undergo training with a view to being fast-tracked for
appointment as Store Manager or Regional Manager within 6 – 12
months.

The respondent’s understanding was that he would commence work in
the

Ladieswear Department in Blanchardstown on Blanchardstown

on the 4th of December 2000. On the 27th of November 2000 the
respondent was directed to report for duty that day to Blanchardstown
and take up a position in the Homewares Department. He considered
this a variation of his agreement with Mrs. Heffernan and he tried to
contact her without success as she was abroad. He did not go to

60
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Blanchardstown on the 27th of November 2000 but was contacted the
next day by the Director of Store Operations Mr. McNiffe.

On the 28th & 29th of November 2000 the Respondent had three
meetings with Mr. McNiffe. At the meeting on the 28th of November
2000 the respondent refused to go to Blanchardstown until such time as
he had spoken with Mrs. Heffernan. There were two meetings on the
29th of November 2000. At the first meeting the respondent read out a
statement which he had prepared but refused to furnish a copy to Mr.
McNiffe and maintained his refusal to go to Blanchardstown. At the
second meeting the Respondent maintained this position and Mr.
McNiffe suspended him from work with pay. Thereafter the
respondent’s communications to the appellant were largely through his
solicitors.

The first solicitors’ letter dated 7th December 2000 made it clear that the
Respondent would go to Blanchardstown on the terms which he had
agreed with Mrs. Heffernan. The matters raised on his behalf were that
the transfer was taking place seven days earlier than agreed, a plan to
fastrack him was not yet prepared and that the position was in
Homewares. In the letter the Respondent’s solicitors said in relation to
the Respondent’s suspension: -

“The effect of this quite extraordinary conduct on the part of the
company towards our client and the stress generated by it, has
resulted in our client becoming ill and he attended his doctor on
1 December and again today, 7 December, who has ordered him
to rest and certificates to this effect have been delivered to the
company.”
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The letter threatened proceedings if the suspension was not lifted. In a
short report of the 31st of January 2001 the Respondent’s treating
surgeon had this to say: -

“Over the last while he has had an exacerbation of symptoms (of
Chron’s disease) and I have no doubt the recent wrangle has
exacerbated his symptoms and has resulted in him having to
increase his medication.”

In a reply of the 12th of December 2000 the Appellant’s solicitors gave
as the reason for the respondent’s suspension his attitude at the meetings
with Mr. McNiffe, his persistence in seeking to speak to Mrs. Heffernan
and his refusal to explain his issues to Mr. McNiffe which they
categorised as unreasonable. The letter indicated that the Appellant was
prepared to overlook the incident provided that the respondent reported
to work in Blanchardstown as son as certified fit to do so by his doctor.

Having considered this evidence Laffoy J. in the High Court categorised
the attitude of each of the parties. The respondent considered that Mrs.
Heffernan was intent on ousting him from his employment. He
attributed this to jealousy of the respondent’s brother who had achieved
remarkable commercial success. Mrs. Heffernan had alluded to this at
the meeting on the 23rd of November 2000. The learned trial judge found
that the appellant was motivated by sound management considerations
in deciding to transfer the respondent from buying to store management.
However the respondent’s solicitors’ letter of the 7th of December 2000
should have sounded alarm bells with the respondent’s senior
management as to the respondent’s state of health.
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On the other hand the appellant inferred from the respondent’s conduct
that he had an ulterior motive in that he was attempting to orchestrate a
situation in which he could get a severance payment or compensation:
the learned trial judged held that this an incorrect inference. Laffoy J.
concluded that while some of the respondent’s behaviour might be
characterised as unreasonable, it was attributable to his trust in the
appellant’s senior management executives having been shattered. The
learned trial judge noted that responses from Mr. McNiffe to the
respondent solicitor’s letters were sent directly to the Respondent at his
home address sometimes by courier and sometimes on Saturday, and,
while the appellant was entitled to communicate directly with the
respondent, this course heightened the respondent’s distrust of the
appellant and increased the stress he was under.

The respondent reported for work in Blanchardstown on the 28th of
December 2000 having been cleared to do so by his doctor. There was
an incident that day. He was dressed casually in the manner in which he
dressed while working as a buyer in Head Office. He was informed by
Mr. Sills, the Store Manager, that the dress code for managers was a
conservative coloured suit and formal footwear. The respondent asked
Mr. Sills to put that in writing and Mr. Sills did so on the 29th of
December 2000.

The respondent explained that he was on the defensive at this time
because of the cumulative effect of the problems which he was having.
He ceased work again for four days on account of his ill health. He
contended that his treatment at Blanchardstown in this period
exacerbated his ill health. He particularised two matters: -

(a)

A document entitled “Drapery Management Analysis” widely
circulated included his name under the heading of “New
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Trainees” which he considered humiliating, defamatory and
vindictive. The document is a manuscript duty roster for the
particular store for a particular week; and

(b)

A personalised 12-week Homewares training plan which was
furnished to him on his arrival was appropriate to a newly joined
trainee and failed to take account of his 21 years experience.

These complaints were contained in a letter of the 11th of January 2000
from the respondent’s solicitors in which it was alleged that these
matters were a continuation of a course of treatment which began the
preceding February designed to sideline him out of management and out
of his employment. The letter demanded the withdrawal of the Drapery
Management Analysis and the preparation of an appropriately devised
training plan. There was a measured and conciliatory response from Mr.
McNiffe by reply dated the 12th of January 2000. Mr. McNiffe explained
the mid-description in the roster as an oversight and sought flexibility on
the respondent’s part in giving the training programme a chance to
work. He explained that in the 12 years since the respondent had been in
store management much had changed and that it was important that the
respondent re-learn the business from the ground up. The respondent
was requested to return to work the following Monday.

By letter dated 21st February 2001 the respondent’s solicitors advised
the Appellant that the respondent’s treating surgeon had indicated that
the respondent might return to work but that before doing so the
respondent required confirmation in relation to the training programme
and his future career path and that a communication be circulated to all
management and staff within Head Office and all stores to correct the
mis-description in the Drapery Analysis Management Analysis.
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There was further correspondence but ultimately a meeting was arranged
for the 7th of March 2001 between the respondent and his solicitor and
Mr. McNiffe and the appellant’s solicitor and at which a stenographer
retained by the respondent attended. Following the meeting Mr. McNiffe
wrote to the respondent setting out the matter which he considered to
have been agreed and this gave rise to further disagreement and further
correspondence. The first matter in issue was the length of time before
the Respondent would proceed to a position as Store Manager or
Regional Manager. Mr. McNiffe suggested that this could take 18
months with an initial position as No.2 before progressing to a position
of No.1 in store management. The respondent was insisting on a time
scale of three to six months rather than the twelve months mentioned by
Mrs. Heffernan at the meeting of the 23rd of November 2000
notwithstanding that he had only attended for work in Blanchardstown
for four days since that meeting. The second related to the training
programme and the extent to which the respondent should be involved in
its preparation.

The first matter was not resolved prior to the respondent leaving his
employment. On the second matter, while a training programme was
produced on the 8th of March 2001, the respondent’s solicitors raised in
correspondence a number of points in relation to same with which Mr.
McNiffe was not prepared to agree. A third matter was in relation to the
Drapery Management Analysis and concerned the text of an
announcement made. The announcement as circulated was not in the
terms agreed.
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The learned trial judge held that the substance of the announcement was
as agreed and she did not consider the variations to be of significance.
The circulation was narrower, Laffoy J. held, than the respondent was
entitled to expect.

The Respondent returned to work towards the end of April 2001. His
solicitors continued to raise issues on his behalf in correspondence. He
continued to work until the 15th of May 2001. On the 15th of May 2001
the respondent was rostered for duty from 10.00am to 8.30pm but
incorrectly believed that he had been rostered for duty from 8.30am to
6.00pm. He attended at 8.30am. During the morning Mr. Sills the Store
Manager made it clear to the respondent that he was required to attend
until 8.30pm and there were heated exchanges. Mr. Sills made it clear
that he was the respondent’s superior and the respondent’s reply was
that Mr. Sills could deal with his solicitor. He did not work until
8.30pm. The learned trial judge found that in relation to this incident the
respondent was in the wrong and that Mr. Sills’ conduct was
understandable.

By letter dated 30th May 2001 the respondent’s solicitors wrote to the
appellant’s solicitors as follows: -

“We refer to our letters of 1 May and 9 May, neither of which
have received a response. Our client has kept us closely advised
of the developments at his place of employment which have had a
severely adverse effect on his health. We have advised our client
that the company has repudiated its obligations towards him as
an employee. Our client has written the enclosed letter to Mrs.
Margaret Heffernan.
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We have been instructed to seek damages against the company in
relation to the company’s repudiation of the contract of
employment and to the reckless imposition by the company of
physical and emotional suffering on our client including an
abusive verbal attack on our client by a senior manage in the
presence of other members of management and staff. Unless we
receive from the company within seven days of the date of this
letter, adequate proposals to compensate our client, proceedings
will issue without any further notice. In that event we shall be
obliged for your confirmation that you have authority to accept
service of such proceedings on behalf of your client.”

The letter from the respondent enclosed therewith complained that the
appellant had failed to honour his understanding of the meeting of the 7th
of March 2001. He complained of the altercation with Mr. Sills on the
15th of May 2001. Finally, he complained that his working environment
was hostile to his health and in consequence he had been advised by his
Consultant to cease working in that environment.

Thereafter the respondent was out of work for a period of approximately
8 months. At the end of January 2002 he obtained a position as a buyer
with another retail group on terms no less favourable than those which
he had enjoyed with the appellant.
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8.2.2 The Findings of the High Court

On the evidence Laffoy J. in the High Court made, inter alia, the
following findings: -

(1)

It was an implied term of the plaintiff’s contract of
employment that the defendant s acting reasonably could
assign him from one work location to another and from
one

management

function

to

another

appropriate

management function.

(2)

It was an implied term of the plaintiff’s contract of
employment that both the employer and employee would
maintain mutual trust and confidence. The defendant was
in breach of that term after the 23rd of November 2000
since the manner in which the defendant dealt with the
plaintiff in the knowledge of the precarious nature of his
physical and psychological health viewed objectively
amounted to oppressive conduct. It was likely to seriously
damage their employer/employee relationship and it did
so.

(3)

A breach by an employer of its implied contractual
obligation to maintain the trust and confidence of an
employee is a breach which goes to the root of the
contract.
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The learned trial judge did not think it would be proper to draw the
inference suggested by the defendant from the plaintiff’s conduct that
the plaintiff had no real intention of giving the change to store
management a chance to work. Laffoy J. stated that: -

“…some

of

his

behaviour

might

be

characterised

as

unreasonable, but I think this is attributable to the fact that his
trust in the defendant’s senior management and executives had
been shattered rather than to any grand design to leave the
defendant with a severance package or compensation.”

Also, in relation to the defendant solicitors’ responses to the plaintiff’s
solicitors correspondence being send directly to his home, sometimes by
courier and sometimes on Saturday, the learned trial judge was of the
view that there was no doubt that this course adopted heightened the
distrust of the plaintiff.

In relation to the claim for breach of contract as pleaded and pursued
before the High Court by Counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, the essence
of this aspect of his claim being that the plaintiff was constructively and
wrongfully dismissed by the defendant , the learned trial judged stated
that, in her view:

“[T]he plaintiff’s submission that there was a series of breaches
of contract on the part of the defendant and that the accumulation
of those breaches resulted in a repudiation by the defendant of
the plaintiff’s contract is not correct. The correct interpretation
of what happened is that the manner in which the defendant dealt
with the plaintiff in the knowledge of the precarious nature of his
physical and psychological health viewed objectively amounted
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to oppressive conduct. It was likely to seriously damage their
employer/employee relationship and it did so. Accordingly, the
defendant breached its obligation to maintain the plaintiff’s trust
and confidence.”

8.2.3 The Approach of the Supreme Court

Finnegan J., delivering the Judgment of the Supreme Court, adopted the
test as set out in Malik wherein Lord Steyn had considered the correct
approach to the question of whether the implied obligation had been
breached and said:

“…given the existence of an obligation of trust and confidence, it
is important to approach the question of a breach of that
obligation correctly. Mr. Douglas Brodie of Edinburgh
University, in his helpful article to which I have already referred
put the matter succinctly, at pp. 121-122:

‘In assessing whether there has been a breach, it seems
clear that what is significant is the impact of the
employer’s behaviour on the employee rather than what
the employer intended. Moreover, the impact will be
assessed objectively’.

Both of Mr. Brodie’s reservations seem to me to reflect classic
contract law principles and I would gratefully adopt his
statement.” 61

61

Ibid at p.622
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Elaborating on the objective nature of the test Lord Steyn went on to
say:

“The implied obligation extends to any conduct by the employer
likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and
confidence between the employer and the employee. It may well
be, as the Court of Appeal observes, that the decided cases
involved instances of conduct which might be described as

‘conduct involving rather more direct treatment of employees’

[1996] ICR 406, 412, so be it but Lord Justice Morritt held that
the obligation:

‘may be broken not only by an act directed at a particular
employee but also by conduct which, when viewed objectively, is
likely to seriously damage the relationship of employer and
employee.’

That is the correct approach. The motives of the employer cannot
be determinative, or even relevant, in judging the employee’s
claims for damages for breach of the implied obligation. If
conduct objectively considered is likely to cause serious damage
to the relationship between employer and employee a breach of
the implied obligation may arise.”
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In relation to the test, the Supreme Court in Berber stated that the
following matters are to be noted: -

1.

The test is objective.

2.

The test requires that the conduct of both employer and employee
be considered.

3.

The conduct of the parties as a whole and the accumulative effect
must be looked at.

4.

The conduct of the employer complained of must be unreasonable
and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be
judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine
if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with
it.

8.2.4 The Findings of the Supreme Court

Applying the appropriate test to the conduct of the respondent in the
Berber case, the Supreme Court focused only on the events which
occurred after the 23rd of November 2000.

The Supreme Court found that in circumstances where the appellant was
first notified that stress was exacerbating the respondent’s Crohn’s
disease on receipt of the solicitor’s letter of the 7th of December 2000,
there was no evidence to justify a conclusion the appellant was aware of
the respondent’s mental condition during the events prior to this date
(such as on the 27th of November 2000 when he was instructed to report
to Blanchardstown and did not do so). The Supreme Court went on to
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conclude that on application of an objective test to the suspension of the
respondent with pay, it could not be said that the same was unreasonable
and found that the appellant acted bona fide and within its rights in
deciding to move the respondent.

Further, in the view of Finnegan J., the respondent’s refusal to cooperate until such time as he should speak to Mrs. Heffernan was
unreasonable. The following passage of law as stated by Smyth J. in
Harrington v Irish Life and Permanent Plc62 was affirmed:

“(a)

The following basic principles are applicable: -

1.

the employer impliedly contracts to obey the lawful
and reasonable orders of his employer (or his
employee’s delegate) within the scope of the
employment he contracted to undertake. Chitty on
Contracts (24th ed. Vol. 2 para. 37 – 050); and

2.

it has long been part of our law that a person
expudiates the contract of service if he wilfully
disobeys the lawful and reasonable orders of his
Master. Such a refusal fully justifies an employer in
dismissing him summarily.

(Per Karminski L.J. in Pepper v Webb [1969] 2 All ER
216 at 218, cited with approval and adopted by Hamilton
J. as he then was in Brewster v Burke & Anor [1985] 4
JISLL 98 at p.100).”

62

Supra, n 55
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Finnegan J. viewed the suspension with pay to be significantly less
draconian than seeking to dismiss the respondent following his refusal to
comply with the direction given to him and objectively considered the
respondent’s conduct as unreasonable. The learned judge highlighted the
fact that on hearing from the respondent’s solicitor by letter dated 7th
December 2000 the appellant gave an unequivocal assurance of
willingness to overlook the incidents provided the respondent returned
to work as soon as his doctor should certify him as fit to do so.

Finnegan J. viewed the exchange in relation to the dress code for
managers as one which would justify concerns in the appellant as to the
course of future interaction with the respondent. It is submitted that
while the respondent’s request to have the dress code put into writing
could be seen as further evidence of the employee’s loss of trust and
confidence in the employer and its subordinates, it was concluded by the
Supreme Court that the occurrence “is neutral for present purposes
neither party having acted unreasonably.”

In dealing with the matter of the training plan, Finnegan J. understood
Laffoy J. findings that the appellant was aware of the respondent’s
vulnerability at the date of preparation of same, to mean the normal
anxiety and concern which any employee might feel on a significant
change in his employment taking place and did not consider the
appellant’s course of conduct to the training plan to be unreasonable or
oppressive.

The final matter dealt with by the Supreme Court under the breach of
contract element of the Appeal was what occurred on the 15th of May
2001 when the respondent incorrectly believe that he had been rostered
for duty from 8.30am to 6.00pm. Finnegan J. viewed the respondent’s
failure to work beyond 6.00pm and his final salvo to Mr. Sills that he
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could deal with his solicitor as being part of a consistent pattern of
conduct in circumstances where the respondent objected to written
communications to him being sent to him directly and the requirement
he had that all such communications be sent to his solicitor.

On this point of appeal, Finnegan J. concluded:

“…I am satisfied that the conduct of the appellant judged
objectively was not such as to amount to a repudiation of the
contract of employment. The conduct judged objectively did not
evince an intention not to be bound by the contract of
employment. On the other hand the conduct of the respondent
was in the instances mentioned above unreasonable or in error
and the employer’s conduct must be considered in the light of
same. In these circumstances the purported acceptance of
repudiation of the contract of employment by the respondent was
neither justified nor effective. The respondent must fail on his
claim under this heading.”

8.3

Conclusion

It is clear that the critical factor in persuading Laffoy J. that the
employer was guilty of “oppressive conduct” was the employer’s
knowledge that the respondent was suffering from stress as a result of
the dispute between him and his employer however the judgment of the
Supreme Court is authority for the proposition that evidence of an
employee’s loss of trust and confidence in his/her employer will now
necessarily require a high standard of proof.
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It is unfortunate that, while the test is objective, the opinion of the
presiding Judges in these types of cases is inevitably subjective. For
example, while Finnegan J. viewed the respondent’s failure to work
beyond 6.00pm and his final salvo to Mr. Sills that he could deal with
his solicitor as being part of a consistent pattern of conduct which was in
the instances mentioned above unreasonable or in error and the
employer’s conduct must be considered in the light of same, such a
pattern of conduct by the respondent could equally be viewed as further
evidence of an absence of trust and confidence in his employer.

While there is remains a limited amount of guidance in these or any
other authorities as to what constitutes a breach of the implied obligation
of trust and confidence, the approach adopted by Laffoy J. in the Berber
case was possibly seen by the Supreme Court as posing unique
difficulties for an employer and perhaps setting too high a standard for
those who are dealing with employees who are claiming to be stressed
as a result of an employment dispute, particularly where the essential
matter in dispute relates to the issue of a lawful instruction, an entirely
commonplace allegation in the context of employment law.
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Chapter 9

Repudiation, The Last Straw & Constructive Dismissal

9.1

Repudiation

As to whether conduct amounts to a repudiation of the contract the
ordinary law of contract applies: the cumulative effect of the acts
complained of must be such as to indicate that a party had repudiated its
contract. 63

By reference to McDermott Contract Law 64 the test as to whether a
breach of contract amounts to repudiation is whether the breach goes to
the root of the contract. A breach by an employer of its implied
contractual obligation to maintain the trust and confidence of an
employee is a breach which goes to the root of the contract.

It had earlier been held in Woods v W.M. Car Services (Peterborough)
Limited 65 by Browne-Wilkinson J. following Courthaulds Northern
Textiles Limited v Andrew 66 that any breach of the implied term that the
employers will not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct
themselves in the manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and
employee was a fundamental breach amounting to a repudiation since it
necessarily went to the root of the contract.

63

Brown v Merchant Ferries Limited [1998] I.R.L.R. 682
McDermott, P.A., 2001.Contract Law. Dublin: Buttersworths, 2001.
65
[1981] I.R.L.R. 347
66
Supra, n.13
64

62

This statement was not accepted by the Court of Appeal in Bliss 67 and
neither was it accepted by Douglas Brodie in his aforementioned
article 68 which was referred to with approval in both Malik and Browne
v Merchant Ferries Limited 69 .

Where the repudiatory breach alleged is of the trust and confidence
term:

“The misconduct of the employer amounting to breach must be
serious indeed since it amounts to constructive dismissal and as
such entitles the employee to leave immediately without any
notice on discovering it. The test is whether the employer’s
conduct is such that the employee cannot reasonably be expected
to tolerate it a moment longer after he has discovered it and can
walk out of his job without prior notice.” 70

It is accepted that an employer may engage in conduct which is ‘out of
order’ without thereby repudiating the contract, although repeated
behaviour of that kind may be a different matter. 71

As considered above, the test to be applied is not subjective. The
employee’s actual perception is not material. The test is an objective
one; this is whether viewed objectively, the employer’s conduct so
impacted on the employee that the employee could properly conclude
that the employer was repudiating the contract. In other words, a Court
must be satisfied that the conduct of the employer judged objectively did
not evince an intention not to be bound by the contract of employment
67

Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] I.R.L.R. 308
Supra, n.20
69
Supra, n.63
70
BCCI v Ali (No. 2) [2000] I.C.R. 1354 at p.1376H
71
Cantor Fitzgerald v Bird [2002] I.R.L.R. 867
68
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and therefore a purported acceptance of repudiation of a contract of
employment by an employee is neither justified nor effective.

9.2

The Last Straw
In Lewis v Motorworld Garages Limited 72 , it was seen to be perfectly
proper for Counsel for the employee to:

“…accumulate the breaches to found the submission that the
totality of the wrongful course of conduct entitled the employee to
claim that the employer had evinced an intention no longer to be
bound by the contract of employment.” 73

This was in circumstances where some of the acts or incidents, which
formed part of a course of conduct, when viewed in isolation, seemed
“quite trivial”.

It was held in Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council 74
that the quality that a “last straw” had to possess was that it was an act in
a series whose cumulative effect amounted to a breach of the implied
term. The essential quality of that act was that, when taken in
conjunction with the earlier acts on which an employee relied, it
amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.

72

[1986] I.C.R. 157
Ibid at p.165
74
[2005] 1 All. E.R. 75
73
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9.3

Constructive Dismissal

Mr. Justice Finnegan on delivering the Judgment of the Supreme Court
in Berber v Dunnes Stores, adopted the law on constructive dismissal as
summarised by Mr. Justice Browne-Wilkinson in Lewis as follows: -

“1.

In order to prove that he has suffered constructive
dismissal an employee who leaves his employment must
prove that he did so as a result of a breach of contract by
his employer, which shows that the employer no longer
intends to be bound by an essential term of the contract:
see Western Excavating (E.C.C.) Limited v Sharp 75 .

2.

However, there are normally implied in a contract of
employment mutual rights and obligations of trust and
confidence. A breach of this implied term may justify the
employee in leaving and claiming that he has been
constructively dismissed: see Post Office v Roberts 76 and
Woods v W.M. Car Services (Peterborough) Limited 77 .

3.

The breach of this implied obligation of trust and
confidence may consist of a series of actions on the part of
the employer which cumulatively amount to a breach of
the term, though each individual incident may not do so. In
particular in such a case the last action of the employer
which leads to the employee leaving need not itself be a
breach of contract; the question is, does the cumulative
series of acts taken together amount to a breach of the

75

[1978] I.C.R. 221
[1980] I.R.L.R. 347
77
Supra, n.65, at 670 per Browne-Wilkinson J.
76

65

implied

term.

See

Woods

W.M.

Car

Services

(Peterborough) Limited 78 . This is the ‘last straw’
situation.”

78

Supra, n.65
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Chapter 10

The Mutuality of the Duty

10.1

Introduction

The obligation of fidelity is plainly mutual: as Laffoy J. described it in
the Berber case, this reciprocal duty is “a two-way street”. Thus it also
imposes duties on the employee including to obey lawful and reasonable
instructions.

Indeed, it has been successfully used by an employer to limit ‘work to
rule’ as a tool of industrial action. In Secretary of State v ASLEF
(No.2) 79 , it was held that an employee must not frustrate the commercial
objectives of the employer be seeking to carry out instructions in an
unreasonable way.

10.2

The Relevancy of the Cumulative Conduct of the Parties

With regard to the application of the implied term to both the employer
and the employee, Mr. Justice Finnegan in delivering the Judgment of
the Supreme Court in Berber referred to the case of Woods v W.M. Car
Services (Peterborough) Limited 80 and quoted the following passage of
Browne-Wilkinson J.:

“In our view it is clearly established that there is implied in a
contract of employment a term that the employers will not,
without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in a

79
80

[1972] Q.B. 455
Supra, n.65
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manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the
relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and
employee; Courtaulds Northern Textiles Limited v Andrew
[1979] IRLR 84. To constitute a breach of this implied term it is
not necessary to show that the employer intended any repudiation
of the contract; the Tribunal’s function is to look at the
employer’s conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such
that its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that the
employee cannot be expected to put up with it: see British
Aircraft Corporation Limited v Austin [1978] IRLR 332 and Post
Office v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347. The conduct of the parties has
to be looked at as a whole and its cumulative impact assessed;
Post Office v Roberts.”

10.3

Conclusion

While it is accepted that the obligation is a “two-way” street, the greater
interest in the term lies in the impact that the duty of mutual trust and
confidence has had on the employer’s obligations.

It is submitted that the weight of this principle of mutuality is in the
consideration of parties’ conduct as a whole and the consequent
assessment of impact on a cumulative basis. This is a practical approach
as it takes into account human nature in terms of how one’s reaction will
naturally be correlative to one’s treatment. It is contended however that
such a principle again appears to allow for an element of subjectivity in
what is supposed to be an objectively tested area of law. If the conduct
of the parties as a whole is considered relevant than it cannot be said that
the test is an objective one as this necessarily takes into account the
relationship of the parties who are the subject of the proceedings and not
merely the reasonable man. Rather, it is the reasonable man in light of
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the particular relationship and this, it is contended, is not a wholly
objective test. Additionally, as was seen in the Berber case, what is
reasonable to one Judge many not be reasonable to another and it is
respectfully suggested therefore that the existing approach of the
judiciary to such matters is overly susceptible to variability which leads
to a lack of guiding precedence and tremulous litigation.
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Chapter 11

Implications of the recognition of the Implied Duty in the context of the
Employment Injunction

11.1

Introduction

Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to grant an injunction which
would involve an element of ongoing supervision and in service or
trading contracts because it is very difficult to assess whether such
orders are being obeyed. A further reason for the courts’ reluctance to
grant injunctions specifically in relation to contracts for personal
services is that as a matter of policy it is undesirable to force individuals
to work together where a relationship of trust and confidence no longer
exists between them. So, it is generally accepted that in the context of
contracts for personal services, an injunction should not be granted
where this would indirectly provide for specific performance of the
positive terms of the contract. 81

As Kelly J stated in Reynolds v Malocco 82 :

“Normally courts will not grant an injunction to restrain
breaches of a covenant in a contract of employment if that would
amount to indirect specific performance of such contract or
would perpetuate a relationship based on mutual trust which no
longer exists”. 83

81

Delany, H., 2006. Employment Injunctions: The Role of Mutual Trust and Confidence (2006) 28
D.U.L.J. 363
82
[1999] 2 I.R. 203
83
Ibid at p.209
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Kenny J. had put the principle more rigidly when in Yeates v Minister
for Posts and Telegraphs 84 he stated, “it is settled law that the courts
never specifically enforce a contract for personal services.” 85

However, it has also been acknowledged that this rule “is plainly not
absolute and without exception”. 86

The courts have developed a realistic attitude towards the question of
whether an injunction is appropriate in such cases. In Page One Records
Ltd v Britton 87 Stamp J. refused to grant an injunction which as a
practical matter would have forced the defendants to employ the
plaintiffs in a fiduciary capacity in circumstances where they “for
reasons good, bad or indifferent” had “lost confidence” in them. 88

This approach was further developed by the Court of Appeal in Warren
v Mendy 89 where the court declined to grant an injunction to restrain the
defendant from inducing a breach of contract where its effect would
arguably have been to force an individual to perform his agreement with
the plaintiff. Nourse LJ said that an injunction would less readily be
granted where there are obligations of mutual trust and confidence and
the servant’s confidence in his master has genuinely gone. This will also
be true where an employer has lost trust and confidence in his employee.

It is a well-established principle that a limited exception exists however
to the normal rule of no intervention by way of an injunction, namely
where a relationship of mutual trust and confidence persists. Therefore,
the continuing presence or absence of such a relationship can be of
84

[1978] I.L.R.M. 22
Ibid at p.24
86
CH Giles Co. v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 at p.319
87
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 157
88
Ibid at p.168
89
[1989] 1 W.L.R. 853
85
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particular significance to a court in determining whether to consider
making an order which would have the effect of obliging parties to
continue working together.

11.2

Tracing the Limited Exception

The starting point in tracing the limited exception to the general
principle that employer and employee should not be forced to work
together in the English jurisdiction is the decision of the majority of the
Court of Appeal in Hill v CA Parsons & Co Ltd 90 where an injunction
was granted against an employer to restrain an alleged wrongful
dismissal after the employer had reluctantly been forced to terminate the
contract of employment of an engineer who had refused to join a trade
union. Lord Denning MR stated:

“If ever there was a case where an injunction should be granted
against the employers, this is the case.” 91

The majority of the court justified its decision on the basis that a
relationship of mutual trust and confidence still existed between the
parties.

The importance of establishing continuing mutual confidence if a court
is to intervene in an employment dispute is also clear from the decision
of Taylor J in Hughes v London Borough of Southwark 92 where he
granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant s from
seeking to enforce an instruction to the plaintiffs that they should carry
out duties other than their normal work. Taylor J stated that:
90

[1972] Ch. 305
Ibid at p.316
92
[1988] I.R.L.R. 72
91
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“the important criterion is as to whether there is mutual
confidence, the point being that it would be inappropriate to
grant an injunction against an employer requiring him to keep on
in service on certain terms a servant who has lost the confidence
of that employer.” 93

He said that the defendant s continued to have “great confidence” in the
plaintiffs and added that it would be quite strong to assume that simply
because there is a dispute between an employer and employee that
mutual confidence has gone.

The concept of a continuing relationship of mutual trust has been
overstretched in some cases 94 and it is submitted that a realistic
approach to the concept is that adopted by Morland J in Robb v
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council 95 wherein the
learned judged granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the
Defendant s from giving effect to a dismissal notice made against him.
In this view the submission made by Counsel for the Defendants that
unless trust and confidence between the employer and employee
remains, an injunction to preserve the contract of employment should
never be granted, was “far too sweeping”.

Morland J. acknowledged, however, that if an injunction is sought to
reinstate an employee dismissed in breach of contract, clearly trust and
confidence are highly relevant as without the confidence of his employer
in his ability to do his job, an employee’s position would be untenable.
In his view “the all important criterion is whether the Order sought is
93

Ibid at p.73
See Irani v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1985] I.R.L.R. 203 and
Powell v London Borough of Brent [1987] I.R.L.R. 466
95
[1991] I.C.R. 514
94
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workable” 96 and he concluded that despite “the very cogent evidence of
loss of trust and confidence,” the balance of convenience required him
to grant the relief sought which was effectively confined to ensuring a
resumption of the appropriate disciplinary procedure initiated against the
Plaintiff.

The effect of the relief sought was fundamental to the court’s decision.
The Plaintiff was essentially seeking to ensure that fair procedures were
followed in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings rather than
reinstatement. As Redmond has commented in reference the case of
Jones v Lee 97 where the Court of Appeal had granted an injunction to
restrain the dismissal of a Plaintiff without a hearing even in
circumstances where his employers appeared to have lost trust and
confidence in him: “Trust and confidence in the Plaintiff’s ability to do
the job had no relevance to the workability of the disciplinary procedure
if ordered by the court”. 98

11.3

The Limited Exception in Ireland

The courts in this jurisdiction have traditionally accepted that as a
general principle, a plaintiff will not be entitled to an interlocutory
injunction which would amount to an indirect order of specific
performance in respect of a contract of employment. 99

96

Ibid at p.520
[1980] I.C.R. 310
98
Supra, n.48
99
Evans v IRFB Services (Ireland) Ltd [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 358
97
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This principle was set out in the following terms by Costello P in Phelan
v BIC (Ireland) Ltd 100 :

“There is a general principle that the courts do not grant
injunctions in cases of termination of employment on the
principle in the old law reports and text books that a contract of
employment is a contract of personal service. But there has been
a strong body of judgment and authorities that this old rule
should be subject to qualifications and in a number of cases the
courts have granted interlocutory relief where it is in the interests
of justice to do so.”

In Becker v Board of Management of St Dominic’s Secondary School101
Clarke J went on to say that there may be exceptions to the general
proposition such as a case where an employer has failed to make out any
arguable basis for a suspension, or has been guilty of an inordinate and
unjust delay in concluding an investigation, as in Martin v Nationwide
Building Society 102 .

The classic starting point in this jurisdiction in terms of the
establishment of exceptions to the general principle is the judgment of
Costello J. in Fennelly v Assicuraziono Generali S PA 103 wherein he
said that he accepted that the court should not require an employer to
continue working with an employee where serious difficulties have
arisen between them or where there is no work for the employee.
However, in the serious case before him he was satisfied that the parties
continued to have “the highest regard for one another” and he made an
order that the defendant should continue to pay his salary until the trial,
100

[1985] I.L.T. 73
[2005] 1 I.R. 561 at p.570
102
Supra, n.37
103
[1985] 3 I.L.T.R. 73
101

75

leaving it to the defendant to decide whether to require the latter to carry
out any duties he might be given or to grant him leave of absence.

In Moore v Xnet Informations Systems Ltd 104 it was confirmed that the
courts will be unwilling to grant an interlocutory injunction requiring an
employee’s reinstatement pending trial at any rate where relations
between the parties have broken down to a significant degree. While
O’Sullivan J. was satisfied that the Plaintiff had made out a fair
argument that he had been wrongfully dismissed, having regard to the
fact that relations between the parties had irretrievably broken down, the
learned judge stated that the balance of convenience did not favour an
order directing the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff pending the
hearing of the case. O’Sullivan J. concluded that the balance of
convenience favoured granting an order directing the defendant to
continue to pay the plaintiff’s salary and other benefits until the trial
subject to an undertaking by the Plaintiff to do any work he was required
to do.

Smyth J. in Hennessy v St. Gerard’s School Trust 105 came to a contrary
conclusion to that reached by O’Sullivan J. in circumstances where
neither reinstatement nor an order restraining the defendant from giving
effect to a purported dismissal were granted. Smyth J. stated that the
“mutuality of respect and trust” had been fractured by the events which
had taken place and that if damages were to be awarded they would be
capable of ascertainment and calculation. In the circumstances he was
satisfied that the plaintiff’s application for interlocutory injunctions
restraining the defendant from dismissing her or from appointing anyone
else to a particular position in the school must be refused.

104
105

[2002] 2 I.L.R.M. 278
Unreported, High Court, Smyth J., 30th July, 2003.
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11.4

Conclusion

It appears that while orders restraining the implementation of a
purported dismissal or termination of appointment may be obtained,
even where the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the
parties has broken down, such orders will be made on limited terms. In
the absence of a continuing relationship of trust and confidence it is
generally accepted however there is no basis on which to make an order
requiring parties to continue to work together even on a temporary basis
or conditional upon certain undertakings from the plaintiff.

It can be said that the significance of the relationship of trust and
confidence will largely depend on the type of interlocutory relief being
sought, of which it could broadly be said there are four which tend to
arise in these situations:

1.

Orders to ensure the continued payment of salary;

2.

Orders to ensure the continuation of other benefits pending trial;

3.

Orders restraining the implementation of a purported dismissal;
and

4.

Orders requiring the Plaintiff’s reinstatement.

As to the first and second type, as was seen in Fennelly 106 above, a good
relationship continued between the parties however this requirement was
subsequently viewed as disposable in all but a few cases where an order
for payment of a plaintiff’s salary was sought. 107

106
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Similarly, orders restraining the appointment of another person to a
position which the plaintiff claims is effectively his, are now fairly
consistently granted even where the relationship between the parties
appears to have broken down. 108

There is more a lack of consistency of approach in relation to the last
two categories. There is evidence in some of the decisions made by the
courts in England such as Irani v Southampton and South-West
Hampshire Health Authority 109 and Powell v London Borough of
Brent 110 of claiming that the employer had not lost confidence in the
employee where working relationships were clearly extremely strained.
It is submitted that the correct approach is that taken by Laffoy J. in
Courtenay v Radio 2000 Ltd 111 where she simply made an order
restraining the implementation of the Plaintiff’s purported dismissal
pending trial and there was no question of determining whether mutual
trust remained as she declined to make an order reinstating the Plaintiff
which would have required the parties to continue to work together.

A distinguishing feature of many of the decisions made is that the courts
often appear to be acting in order to ensure compliance with the rules of
natural justice and the proper application of disciplinary procedures.112
There is therefore no need to establish an ongoing good relationship
between the parties as it is not contemplated that they would continue to
work together pending trial. To this extent it is arguable that the concept
of the importance of a continuing relationship of mutual trust and
confidence in cases where interlocutory injunctive relief is sought in an

108
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employment context could now in many instances be described as
something of a red herring. 113

It is becoming increasingly clear that the modern interpretation of the
concept of mutual trust and confidence is that it is prescriptive in nature
and it effectively obliges the parties to a contract of employment to
behave in a manner which will preserve the relationship between them.
This is a shift away from the traditional view of a relationship of trust
and confidence as an essential prerequisite to the effective functioning of
the employer/employee relationship and previously in considering
whether interlocutory relief might be granted on an exceptional basis the
court would seek to determine whether this relationship was still intact.

Professor Delany opines that the growing acceptance of the principle
that the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between employer
and employee gives rise to rights and obligations on both sides should
undoubtedly make it easier for an employee to obtain interlocutory
injunctive relief to ensure that for example an employer observes
accepted standards of natural justice in pursing disciplinary proceedings
against him. She considers that it would therefore be ironic if the
absence of a continuing relationship of mutual trust and confidence in
the traditional sense of that term were to work against an employee who
might be refused an injunction on the grounds that this relationship no
longer existed between the parties. 114

113
114
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Bolger & Ryan submit that given the increasing tendency to see
injunctions restraining disciplinary proceedings115 which is probably
encouraged by the difficulty in now obtaining injunctive relief to restrain
a dismissal, this is an area where further analysis of the implied duty of
trust and fidelity may be seen in the future. 116

115

A recent example being the case of Minnock v Irish Casing Company Ltd and Robert Stewart,
Unreported, High Court, Clarke J., May 24, 2007.
116
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Chapter 12

Implications of the Recognition of the Implied Duty on the Development of
the Law Relating to Discretionary Bonuses

12.1

Introduction

There have been some interesting recent developments in recognising an
employee’s right to payment of a bonus, even where the employer has
attempted to restrict the entitlement to payment on the exercise of the
employer’s discretion, thereby leaving the employee who might be out
of favour with their employer or former employer in a very vulnerable
position.

It is proposed to consider the circumstances in which the courts will find
that the mutual duty of trust and confidence between employer and
employee has implications for claims relating to bonus payments in light
of recent Irish and English case law involving discretionary bonus
payment schemes.

12.2

Obligation to Explain a Failure to Pay

It is submitted that requiring an employer to give reasons for nonpayment of a bonus is consistent with the fulfilment of the obligation of
trust and confidence which underlies the employment relationship. As
recently observed by Mummery LJ in the English Court of Appeal in
Commerzbank AG v Keen 117 :

117
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“If the parties have agreed that an employer should have a
discretion to decide, by reference to certain factors, whether an
employee should be paid an additional remuneration by way of
bonus for work done under the contract of employment and, if so,
how much, the employer is under an obligation to treat his
employee fairly in explaining the situation.”

Therefore, if a bonus is refused in circumstances where an employee
might reasonably have expected to receive one, an employer should
provide an explanation to the employee as to why the bonus has not
been paid. Such an explanation should include the factors which have
influence the decision, the name of the person who took the decision (if
this is unclear) and the reasons for the decision taken.

12.3

“Please Sir, may I have some more?”

Alternatively, if the employee claims to have been awarded a bonus
which was irrationally small, the employee must show that the amount
paid by way of bonus is less in amount than the sum that would have
been paid by another rational and reasonable employer. In Abu Dhabi
National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd (The Product Star)
(No.2) 118 Leggatt LJ read into a contractual discretion the requirement:

“Not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good
faith but, having regard to the provisions of the contract, by
which it is conferred, it must not be exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously or unreasonably.” 119

118
119

[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397
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It can be seen from the foregoing that transparency is key in order to
avoid potential claims where a bonus scheme is operated. Assessments
should be articulated in rational and objective terms so as to show that
the decisions were made in good faith and that they were in now way
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 120

12.4 Exercising the Discretion

The recent High Court judgment of Finnegan v J&E Davy 121 is
significant in this context. The case concerned a stockbroker who sued
his former employer for €260,000 in deferred bonus payments earned in
1998 and 1999. The plaintiff worked for Davy between 1990 and 2000.
His bonuses were tied to the firm’s profitability and his own
performance, with the amounts being decided at a yearly meeting with
his superiors, where his performance was assessed. He did not receive a
bonus in 1992, but in every other year between 1990 and 1997, he
earned bonuses of between £3,000 and £30,000. The entire sum was
paid shortly after the annual review.

In 1997, the firm began deferring part of the payments. The timeline of
events here is significant. At the beginning of 1998, it was agreed that
the plaintiff’s bonus for 1997 would be £100,000. He was paid £60,000
immediately, but £40,000 was deferred for a year. Its payment was
conditional on his remaining with the firm. The plaintiff objected to this,
particularly, the condition that he stay with the company, but was told
that Davy’s biggest shareholder, Bank of Ireland, stipulated tat bonuses
be paid in this way. It was, however, agreed that he would receive the
interest earned on the money. A year later, his bonus for 1998 was set at
120
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£200,000, payable in three instalments, the first immediately, the second
a year later, and the third a year after that. His 1999 bonus was fixed at
£210,000, payable in tree equal instalments over two years. All deferred
payments depended on his remaining with the company. The plaintiff
left Davy’s to join a rival firm in September 2000. As a result, he did not
receive one instalment of his 1998 bonus and two-thirds of his 1999
payment, a total equivalent to just over €260,000. He argued that the
attempt to change the terms of the bonus scheme was:

1.

a unilateral attempt by the Defendant to alter the terms of the
employment contract which was not accepted by the Plaintiff and
which was ineffective;

2.

in breach of the employment contract as being an irrational
exercise of the employer’s discretion; and

3.

an unenforceable term as being in restraint of trade.

On behalf of the defendant employer, it was argued that such a deferred
payment scheme was a legitimate means of ‘incentivising’ employees
and an attempt to generate loyalty. For present purposes, then, the
question of whether the duty of fidelity of the employee could be
invoked by the employer to justify its approach to the bonus scheme in
this case is relevant. Smyth J. emphatically rejected the argument that
the deferral acted to ‘incentivise’ employees and instead found as a fact
that the real reason for the deferral was “to create a financial and
practical restriction on employees who wished to continue to act as
stockbrokers going to another firm of stockbrokers”.
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The plaintiff argued that in circumstances where bonus payments were
calculated by reference to profitability of the firm in a calendar year and
the individual performance of the plaintiff during that year, it was
arbitrary and irrational to seek to make the payment of that bonus
conditional upon the plaintiff remaining in the employment of the
defendant for the following two years. The effect of this stipulation
would be to change the criteria for the awarding of the bonus from one
of profitability and performance to one of loyalty in the future. Smyth J.
accepted this argument and deemed the provision which amounted to a
restraint of trade to constitute an improper exercise of discretion.
Another significant finding of fact in this regard was that those
employees who left the firm when outstanding elements of bonuses were
unpaid, but did not go into competition, were paid the outstanding
monies. This finding of fact supported the conclusion that if the deferral
provision was part of a contract it was part of a contract in restraint of
trade.

In concluding that the discretion had been improperly exercised, Smyth
J. had regard to a number of English authorities including Horkulak v
Cantor Fitzgerald 122 wherein the Court of Appeal laid down the
principles as to how disputes relating to discretionary bonuses should be
assessed. Potter LJ accepted that the employee was entitled “to a bona
fide and rational exercise [by the employers] of their discretion as to
whether or not to pay him a bonus and in what sum”. 123

He further accepted that, although the particular contract did not contain
any particular formula or point of reference for the calculation of the
bonus, the obligation was to consider the question of bonus as a rational
and bona fide exercise when taking into account the criteria adopted for
122
123
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the purpose of arriving at a decision. Significantly, Potter LJ considered
that to do otherwise would be to “fly in the face of the principles of trust
and confidence which have been held to underpin the employment
relationship”. 124

Therefore in assessing the exercise of discretion by the employer
regarding the bonus at issue in Horkulak the Court of Appeal expressly
attached weight to the “principles of mutual trust and confidence which
have been held to underpin the employment relationship”. 125

12.5

Putting Targets beyond Reach

In the case of Takacs v Barclays Services Jersey Ltd

126

the implied duty

of trust and confidence was again seen to exert influence over a dispute
in relation to a discretionary bonus. Mr. Takacs, an investment banker,
had failed to meet his targets and was dismissed shortly before he was
entitled to his bonus for the current bonus year. Importantly, the terms of
his contract expressly provided that to qualify for the bonus he had to
meet certain targets. The contract also provided that to be eligible for a
bonus payment one had to be an employee of the bank on the date for
payment of the bonus and not working out a notice period at the time the
award was due.

Mr. Takacs brought a claim for breach of contract. He argued that
Barclay’s was in breach of the implied duty of mutual trust and
confidence, the implied duty of “co-operation” and an implied term of
“anti-avoidance”. Mr. Takacs alleged that the bank had prevented him
from achieving the targets he needed in order to qualify for the bonus,
124
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since the bank had recruited a team of specialists who took over the deal
that he was involved in and forced him out. This, he argued, constituted
a breach of the implied duty of co-operation which requires employers
to co-operate with colleagues in the achievement of their targets. He also
argued that an implied term of “anti-avoidance” meant that employers
should be prevented from terminating the employment of their staff to
avoid paying them their substantial bonus entitlements.

Barclays Bank brought a summary judgment application before the
Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court. The court held
however, that Mr. Takac’s claim of breach of the implied terms had a
real prospect of success and should proceed to a full trial. Whilst it must
be emphasised that this does not amount to a final ruling, the approach
taken is significant and provides a clear reminder that the implied duty
of trust and confidence may influence courts in their assessment of
bonus disputes.

12.6

Conclusion

In light of the English cases considered above together with recent Irish
case law which has shown strong support for the role of the implied duty
of trust and confidence in the employment relationship, it appears that
increased recourse to the implied duty will exert considerable influence
on the development of the law relating to bonuses in this jurisdiction,
particularly perhaps in assessing the propriety of the exercise by an
employer of discretion in relation to such bonuses.
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Chapter 13

Implications of the recognition of the Implied Duty in the context of the
Workplace Bullying

13.1

Introduction

While bullying in this jurisdiction is a health and safety issue and it
relies on the general duties and obligations employers owe, under both
common law and the safety and health legislation, to protect their
employees from injury at work, it also raises the implied contractual
term of mutual trust and confidence which is often accompanied by the
principle of vicarious liability.

13.2

Definition of Workplace Bullying

Bullying has no direct basis in legislation and thus the term has no
statutory definition. The Task Force on the Prevention of Workplace
Bullying recommended the following definition in its Report in 2001,
“Dignity at Work – the Challenge of Workplace Bullying”:

“Workplace Bullying is repeated inappropriate behaviour, direct
or indirect, whether verbal, physical or otherwise, conducted by
one or more persons against another or others, at the place of
work and/or in the course of employment, which could
reasonably be regarded as undermining the individual’s right to
dignity at work.
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An isolated incident of behaviour described in this definition may
be an affront to dignity at work but as a once off incident is not
considered to be bullying.” 127

Examples of the type of bullying behaviour set out in the Task Force Report
include:

•

Undermining an individual’s right to dignity at work;

•

Humiliation;

•

Intimidation;

•

Verbal abuse;

•

Victimisation;

•

Exclusion and isolation;

•

Intrusion by pestering, spying and stalking;

•

Repeated unreasonable assignments to duties which are obviously
unfavourable to individual;

• Repeated requests giving impossible deadlines or impossible tasks; and
•

13.3

Implied threats. 128

Vicarious Liability

Where bullying is perpetrated by a supervisor or manager against a
subordinate then it will represent a breach of an employer’s duty to
maintain his employee’s trust and confidence. It is well settled that
employers are liable for the wrongdoings of their employers if
committed “within the scope of this employment” by virtue of vicarious
liability. In many cases the employer the employer will neither be
127

Report of the Task Force on the Prevention of Workplace Bullying, 2001. “Dignity at Work – The
Challenge of Workplace Bullying”. Dublin: Government Publications.
128
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involved in the bullying nor even aware that such bullying is taking
place, especially with technology making the victims all the more
accessible to discrete yet effective bullying. 129

13.4

Conclusion

The breach of the employer’s implied duty to maintain trust and
confidence in respect of workplace bullying is usually claimed as part of
a personal injury claim and/or constructive dismissal.

Whether creating or condoning an organisational culture that permits
perpetration of bullying in the workplace would be deemed by the courts
to be operating the business in a dishonest and corrupt manner along the
lines of that found in Malik, remains to be seen. 130

It is submitted however, that with the significant expansion of the scope
of the implied term of trust and confidence, employers will be acting in
breach of this term where they are discourteous, intimidatory or
insulting, behaviours which are all characteristic of bullying.

129
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Chapter 14

Waiving a Breach of the Duty

14.1

Introduction

It is possible to waive a breach of the duty of mutual trust and
confidence. This was evidenced in the Bliss case wherein, while the
employee was held on the facts not to have done so, such a conclusion
would have been wholly permissible.

In Malik Lord Steyn stated that the implied term of trust and confidence
operated as a default rule, and that the parties were free to exclude it or
modify it. 131 This analysis is entirely consistent with the decision of the
House of Lords in Johnson.

14.2

Limits to the Doctrine of Contracting Out

Of course there are limits to the doctrine of contracting out. For
example, the argument in Horkulak that the size of an employee’s
remuneration and benefits package written into their contract of
employment justified the disapplication of the duty of trust and
confidence was not upheld.

For an employer to establish that an employee has waived a breach,
however, it would appear necessary to show that this was done with
“actual knowledge” of one’s legal rights. In the Bliss case, Dillon LJ
imported the following dictum from Peyman v Lanjani 132 :

131
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“…[I] do not think that a party to a contract can realistically or
sensibly be held to have made this irrevocable choice between
rescission and affirmation unless he has actual knowledge not
only of the facts of the serious breach of the contract by the other
party which is the precondition of his right to choose, but also of
the fact that in the circumstances which exist he does have that
right to make that choice which the law gives him”.

14.3

Conclusion

There could be considerable repercussions in employment law if this
line of reasoning was to be followed and as stated by Dillon LJ in Bliss,
it is a formidable argument. Obviously, it would be more difficult for an
employer to establish that an employee had waived a breach if it had to
be shown that this was done with ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.
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Chapter 15

An Emerging Overarching Principle?

15.1

Introduction

There exists a view that the implied term of trust and confidence may
evolve to engulf the more ‘traditional’ implied terms, such as the
implied duty to take reasonable care for the employee’s welfare, health
and safety. Professor Freedland in The Personal Employment
Contract 133 stated that:

“almost any particular implied term of the contract of
employment could in theory be placed under…[the] umbrella [of
the general obligation of mutual trust and confidence]; it remains
to be seen how far this framework approach will lead to the
swallowing up of existing, hitherto distinct, implied terms.” 134

Similarly, Brodie has argued that if any rationalisation of the normative
content of each of the implied terms of the contract of employment is to
be made, such an exercise may be conducted by grouping them under an
all-embracing principle of mutual trust and confidence.

He opines that as the number of reported cases on mutual trust and
confidence steadily increases it may not be fanciful to suggest that the
obligation will come to be seen as the core common law duty which
dictates how employees should be treated during the course of the
employment relationship. In this regard the embryonic nature of the

133
134

Supra, n.21
Supra, n.21 at p.159

93

obligation is important because the courts and tribunals can expand its
scope relatively unrestricted by precedent. The open-textured nature of
the term makes it an ideal conduit through which the courts can channel
their views as to how the employment relationship should operate.

15.2

Implied Duties are Inherently Distinct

Following detailed analysis of the viability of the emergence of an
overarching principle by David Cabrelli, Lecturer in Law, University of
Dundee, a fundamental point was made that all of the implied duties are
inherently distinct and that, on balance there is no evidence of the
implied duty of mutual trust and confidence as an umbrella principle.
The trends in the recent case law have emphasised the distinctiveness of
the duties to take reasonable care and mutual trust and confidence. He
demonstrates that both duties are separate, free-standing duties (of equal
importance) and to rationalise one and/or all of the traditional employerorientated duties, as one of the means by which the super-principle of
trust and confidence is, or may be expressed, is to a large extent
‘aspirational’ 135 . 136

15.3

Conclusion

In considering whether Ireland might allow the general obligation of
trust and confidence to develop into an umbrella principle, it is
submitted that existing inconsistencies are slowly being mitigated in this
area of development and the path through the law which may be
followed is steadily being made clearer.

135

As described by Professor Freedland in The Personal Employment Contract, supra, n. 21 at p.161
Cabrelli, D., 2005. The Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching
Principle? I.L.J. Vol. 34, No.4

136

94

It is submitted that the current approach of the judiciary in Ireland and in
the UK in cutting through previously equivocal precedent and declaring
in forthright terms is more favourable. Permitting the development of
such an umbrella principle would, if anything, bring the law on this area
into a vague and capricious realm.
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Chapter 16

Conclusions

The implied term of trust and confidence is an example of how the common
law has changed to recognise a person’s employment is usually one of the most
important things in his or her life as it gives not only a livelihood but an
occupation, an identity and sense of self-esteem.

The Courts have used principle of trust and confidence imaginatively to try to
balance the unequal distribution of power in the employment relationship, so
that the implied duty now “certainly seems to extend beyond a precise
formulation to a normative approach or framework of standards for employing
entities and employees elaborated in particular contexts”. 137

While the question of whether Addis will be followed in this jurisdiction awaits
resolution, it is submitted that it is probable that the finding of the House of
Lords will be followed such that an employee will not be able to recover
damages for the manner in which a wrongful dismissal took place or for injured
feelings.

The position at common law, therefore, continues to be that an employer is
entitled to dismiss an employee for any reason or no reason, on giving
reasonable notice, and that damages for the manner of a dismissal are confined
to those damages to which an employee would be entitled for the notice period
and do not include damages for the manner of dismissal.

137
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The Supreme Court decision in Berber displays that evidence of an employee’s
loss of trust and confidence in his/her employer will now necessarily require a
high standard of proof. It is considered that the judicial climate is in favour of
avoiding the potential for the duty to set too high a standard for those who are
dealing with employees who are claiming to be stressed as a result of an
employment dispute.

It is contended that the application of a purely objective test is one of the
methods used to achieving this aim and that this is too narrow an approach to
what is an area of employment law which necessarily involves emotive
relationships. Further, it is submitted that such a contention contradicts the
requirement to consider the parties’ conduct as a whole and the impact of
behaviour of a cumulative basis.

The considerable potential which remains in this area can clearly be seen in the
emerging law on bonus payments and increased recourse to the implied duty
will continue to exert considerable influence on the development of this area of
law, particularly in assessing the propriety of the exercise by an employer of
discretion in relation to such bonuses.

There is an opportunity for the law relating to workplace bullying to be guided
by the operation of the implied obligation to maintain an employee’s trust and
confidence. It is suggested that creating or condoning an organisational culture
that permits perpetration of bullying in the workplace should be deemed by the
courts to be operating the business in a dishonest and corrupt manner along the
lines of that found in Malik and further employers who act in an intimidatory or
insulting behaviour (i.e. bullying) should be seen to be acting in breach of this
term.
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The potentially far-reaching detrimental consequences of a finding that an
employee has waived a breach of the implied duty should be balanced with a
requirement that an employer must establish that an employee had waived a
breach while having ‘actual knowledge’ of his legal rights.

As regards whether Ireland should allow the general obligation of trust and
confidence to develop into an umbrella principle, it is suggested that it would
be preferable in the interests of clarity that existing inconsistencies should
continue to be mitigated and previously equivocal precedent should be dealt
with such that it will be possible to declare what the law relating to the implied
duty is in forthright terms and in terms of the route to achieving such an
objective, the development of the duty into an overarching principle would a
step in the wrong direction.
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